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HERACLITUS: SOME CHARACTERISTICS*)
MIROSLAV MARCOVICH
Back in 19 38, Hermann Fraenkel had suggested that geometrical
proportions (a : b = b : c) made a characteristic "thought
pattern" ("Denkform") in Heraclitus. The idea was met with
approval by Karl Reinhardt (1942),^^ G. S. Kirk (1954), '^^
4)Charles H. Kahn (1979), and others. Three Heraclitean frag-
ments are usually adduced as the clearest examples of such
geometrical proportions: B 79, B 83, and A 13 DK ( = Frs. 92,
5
)
[92b], and 65 M) . I shall argue here — as I did in the
past -- that geometrical proportions are not likely to be
a characteristic "thought pattern" of Heraclitus. I think
Fraenkel' s interpretation of B 79 is wrong, B 83 is most pro-
bably spurious, while A 13 may be more plausibly explained
without recurring to geometrical proportions.
B 79 reads: 'Avfip vnuLOg nxouae Tip6s 6aLuovos, SHcoonep
TtaLS tip6q a,v5p6c. "Man is called foolish by God, just as a
child is by a man." Now, already E. Petersen (back in 1879)
had interpreted the saying as a mathematical proportion: "A
boy stands to an adult man in the same ratio as does an adult
, , , 7)
man to God" (iiaLQ : dvriP = avriP : 6aLU0)v) . Unaware of Peter-
sen's article, Fraenkel interpreted the saying as follows:
"For the sake of convenience, we call this pattern by the
name of the geometrical mean and transcribe it by formulae
such as God / man = man / boy, using mathematical language
rather loosely and disclaiming mathematical strictness...
There are three planes: the levels of God, man, and child
(A, B and C) . The degree of perfection decreases, and the
degree of imperfection increases, in equal measure in the
transitions from A to B and from B to C (A / B = B / C)
"
(p. 314 = 258)
.
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In my view, however, the saying expresses a fundamental
difference betv/een God and Man in respect to "true knov/ledge,
insight or wisdora," — not a difference in degree only. For,
first, since Homer vnriLOQ means " foolish p silly, childish"
(LSJ, s.v,, II. 1), and the implication of our saying is that
"the knowledge" a small child may possess is no knowledge
at all. Second, my interpretation is strongly supported by
B 78 (90 M) , "Human nature has no insight, but the divine has."
As a matter of fact, Heraclitus follows in B 78 and B 79 an
old folkloric motif contrasting divine wisdom to a total lack
of such in mortals: compare, e.g., Iliad 2.485 f.; Pindar
Paean 6.51 ff
.
; Nem. 6.1 f.; Alcmaeon B 1; maybe Xenophanes
8
)
B 23-25 vs. B 34; Theognis 141 f.; LXX Isaiah 55:8-9.
In brief, B 79 would mean: "In God's eyes, Man is as far
from having a true insight as is a child in the eyes of an
adult man." The means employed is not a geometrical proportion,
but rather a traditional simile (cf . OKcocraep) , in which the
tertium oomparationis between "adult man" and "child" is
VTiTCLdxnQf "foolishness: " both of them are equally "childish" as
compared to God's wisdom or insight.
B 83 reads: ' AvOpooiioJV 6 aocpcoxaxoc rcpoQ de6v iiLdnKOg
cpavELxaL Hal aocpttn xaL xdAAe l kqI xolc dAAoie naaiv (Ps. -Plato
9)
Hippias maior 289 b 4) . Now, according to Fraenkel, the say-
ing would express the following geometrical proportion:
riLdriHOc : dvdpooicoe = dvdpcoaos : OeoQ. But, as Paul Wendland
(back in 1903) -"-^^ and W. Zilles-'--'-^ had pointed out, B 83 is
not likely to be a genuine fragment but rather derives from
B 79. As a matter of fact, since the times of Semonides (7.71-
82 West) monkey is known as a personification of ugliness
{1.12, atoxtoxa u^v np^acorca) , not of stupidity. If so, then
nCdriKoe in our text has nothing to do with aocpiTji and, most pro-
bably, was introduced by the author of Hippias maior who is
dealing with the topic of x6 xdAXoe. Compare 2 89 a 3, nidT^HUv
6 wdAXLOxoe aCaxp6s dvdpcortxov y^vel auu3dAAeLV ( = B 82).
IVhat is more important, from Eusebius De theophania 1.73
(p. 74.5 Gressmann)it becomes clear that the word oocplt;i in our
text had replaced the word vrinuoc ("childish") and that the
saying originally read: 'AvSpconcov 6 oocpcixaxoQ upbQ deov vt^uloq,
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which is no more than a paraphrase of B 79, 'Avfip vriTiLos
fiKOuae Txpoc 6aLUOVos (so Wendland) . But even if B 83 were an
independent saying, still it would not support the theory of
geometrical proportions. For, once the word TxtSriHOg is exposed
as an intruder into the text, "the third level" of Fraenkel
will have disappeared.
Finally, A 13 deals with the astronomical "great year"
of Heraclitus, consisting of 10,800 solar years. Now, since
12)Paul Tannery (back in 1887) the figure of 10,800 has been
usually explained by means of "a human generation," which ac-
cording to Keraclitus A 19 (108 M) consists of 30 years --
1 : 360 - 30 : 10,800. I.e., "One day stands to one solar year
in the same ratio as does one human generation to a "great
year." Apparently, in this interpretation the magnus annus
is understood as "one generation of the universe."
One may, however, ask: What has "a human generation" to
do with the merely astronomical term of magnus annus? As a
matter of fact, one human generation of Heraclitus is based
upon an old folkloric — hebdomadal — belief: It is the least
space of time for a grandson (say, Nicomachus) to become a
grandfather (Nicomachus), assuming that a man becomes procrea-
tive at the earliest age of fourteen and that the time from
engendering till birth is one year. Accordingly, 2 x (14 + 1) =
= 30 years.
On the other hand, as B.L. van der Waerden had pointed
13)
out, magnus annus is an old astronomical term reducible
2to Babylonian sars (one sar is equal to 60 = 3,600). If so,
then Heraclitus' great year of 10,800 solar years is equal to
three Babylonian sars, Berosus ' world-period of 432,000 years
(Fr.29 Schnabel) -- to 120 sars, the great year of the great
India of 4,320,000 years — to 1,200 sars. Incidentally, the
Platoniaus annus of 12,960,000 days {Republic VIII, 546 be)
2 14
)
would be then an ideal "super-sar" ( = 3,600 ). In any
case, no geometrical proportions are needed.
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If mathematical proportions are not likely to be a "thought
pattern" of Heraclitus, what then might we call his character-
istic means of expression, if any? I would like to suggest
that such a habit of the Ephesian consists of: (1) the paradox;
(2) the employment of countless folklovio motifs: {3) the use
of traditional wisdom (proverbs, etc.); (4) of popular vivid
similes; (5) , finally, of metrical forms as well.
(1) The Paradox. Heraclitus' use of the paradox seems to be
inconsistent. Namely, (A) most of the times the paradox appears
as an objective and necessary phenomenon, reflecting the under-
lying essence of things which is paradoxical itself. That seems
to be true of both his major teachings -- the theory of a di-
vine, everliving Fire as the underlying essence of all things,
operative in his cosmology, psychology and theology; and the
theory of an objective, universally valid principle called
Logos, according to which two opposites form a continuum
within every given thing. (The former teaching I call briefly
Physios, the latter -- kind of Metaphysics .)
So we read, e.g., in B 84a (56a M) , uexapdAAov dvauaueTaL
.
"It is in changing that it (Fire ?) finds its rest," Or take
the necessary paradox in B 36 (66 M) , "For souls it is death
to become water, for water it is death to become earth. And
nevertheless, it is out of earth that water comes-to-be , and
out of water, soul." (In other words, "origin" and "death,"
"beginning" and "end" coincide, which may be paradoxical but
is so by necessity.) Or else, B 32 (84 M) , "Ev, to ao(p6v
uouvov , XtyzGbo.1 oOk eO^AeL xal eOeAei Zr|v6s ovoucx. "One (be-
ing), the only (truly) Wise, is both unwilling and willing
to be called by the name of Zeus."
Moving to Heraclitus' Logoslehre , the idea of a naAtvTOvos
dpuovLfi^ OKcaonep xd^ou, "a back-stretching connection, like
that of a (strung but resting) bow," B 51 (27 M) , a rerum
oonoordia discors (Horace Epist. 1.12.19), is paradoxical
enough. For the traditional Anaximandrean and Pythagorean (?)
opposites are at variance with each other. But now we learn
that they of necessity form a continuum, connection or unity.
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The idea was strange enough, and Heraclitus himself had to
admit that "people do not understand how (ohojq) what is being
brought apart nevertheless comes together with itself (reading
with Plato in B 51 (27 M) , ou SuvloLolv okoos 5i,acpep6uevov
ecouTcp iuuipepexaL ) .
There is an underlying unity or connection, a hidden single
continuum between two opposites (or extremes) within every gi-
ven thing -- between a straight and a crooked path; the way up
and the way down the hill; beginning and end; the purest and
the foulest water; living and dead, life and death, young and
old, the waking and the sleeping; day and night; v/arm and cold,
dry and wet; disease and health, hunger and satiety, weariness
and rest; justice and injustice; light and darkness; immortals
and mortals; Hades and Dionysus; (yellow) gold and (yellow)
straw; barley and wine (in a barley-posset) ; (honey) and
bitter vetch, and so on. This universal principle or rule (Lo-
gos) is a necessary paradox, and Keraclitus expresses this
aoinoidentia oppositorum in paradoxical statements.
Possibly, to the same Logoslehre belong such paradoxical
sayings of the Ephesian as these: B 48 (39 M) , "The name of
the thing called bow (3l6q) is life (3los) , its work is death"
-- implying that the opposites "life" and "death" are two
halves of a thing (here, "the bow"), as inseparable and essent-
ial for the thing as are its "name" and its "function." Or
take the enigmatic B 12^ (40 M) , "The name (so Seneca) of
the thing called 'river' (say, Cayster) is always the same,
its content (here, water), however, is each time different
{other )" -- in other words, the opposites "the same" and
"other" form one single continuum in the same way in which
"the name" and "the content" of a thing are its two inseparable
and essential parts. Or else, B 21 (49 M) , "Death is all we
see when awake, life is all we see when asleep" (reading uixap
for Clement's misinterpretation unvog, for the text as trans-
mitted, "...and all we see when asleep is sleep," is nonsen-
sical to me)
.
As though this paradox of the universal coincidentia opposi
torum were not enough, Heraclitus keeps producing striking
paradoxical statements on every occasion, each time reflecting
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the paradoxical essence of things. B 54 (9 M) , "Invisible
(underlying) connection is stronger than visible (tangible)
"
(dpuovLfi dc?avfis cpavepns kpelttcov). B 80 (28 M) , "Strife is
Justice (or "the normal and fair course of affairs," not Peace).
B 53 (29 M) , "War is father of all and king of all" (not Zeus,
as Homer would have us believe). B 30 (51 M) , "(Strange as it
may look,) this world-order is an everliving fire." B 96 (76 M)
,
"Corpses should be thrown out sooner than dung" (instead of
being honored with a burial rite). B 52 (93 M) , "Human age is
a child at play..." B 6 (58 M) , "Every day there is a new sun."
B 3 (57 M) , "The sun is the size of a human foot" (i.e., the
sun is a o-nd(^r\ , a basin for washing feet^ serving as a focus
in which the hot sea-exhalation ignites every morning)
.
(B) Alas, the force of this objective and necessary paradox
in the surrounding world is, so to say, undermined by Heraclitus
'
employment of the paradox as a consequence of men's ignorance
.
Once this ignorance is dispelled — by the light of Heraclitus'
instruction, -- men's paradoxical behavior v/ill disappear.
Here are a few examples of this unnecessary paradoxical
behavior of men. B 1 (1 M) , "Although this Logos (principle) is
real (eciv, compare Herodotus 1.95.1; 1.116.5; Aristoph. Frogs
1052), men constantly (aCeu) fail to comprehend it...;" B 17
(3 M) , "Host men do not notice things they encounter (i.e.,
which are right before their eyes)...;" B 28^ (20 M) , "VJhat
the most renowned man (among the Greeks, such as Pythagoras,
Homer or Hesiod) knows and maintains is but fancies;" B 56
(21 M) , "Men are mistaken in the recognition of obvious things,
just as Homer was, although he was considered wiser than any
other Greek...;" B 2 (23^^ M) , "Although this Logos (principle)
is common to all (i.e., universally valid), most men live as
if they had a wisdom of their own;" B 20 (99 M) , "Once born,
they (the multitude) want to live and have their dooms. (What
is worse,) they leave children behind them, so that (new) dooms
may come into being" ("...damit der Tod nicht aussterbe,"
Reinhardt) ; B 125a (106 M) , "May wealth never fail you, men of
Ephesus, so that your wickedness may be manifestly proven (ex-
posed)!" B 124 (107 M) , "(For them) the fairest world-order is
but a heap of sweepings piled up at random;" B 72 (4 M)
,
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"They are at odds with their most constant companion;" B 5
(86 M) ; B 104 (101 M) , and many others.
How may we explain the combination of (A) and (B) in Hera-
clitus? The fact that the paradox appears as an obj eotive ne-
cessity and, at the same time, as an unnecessary consequence
of human ignorance? I would suggest, by the mawerick, intran-
sigent, rebellious personality of the thinker himself. Doubt-
less, Heraclitus was a strong individuality, self conscient of
his role as an Enlightener -- compare, e.g. , the eyoo in B 1
(1 M) , 55 (5 M) , 101 (15 M) , 108 (83 M) . As is known, Hera-
clitus is the Presocratic philosopher who names most names --
less often with approval (Homer, Thales, Bias, Hermodorus),
more often with rebuke and derision (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus
;
Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus)
.
The political plight of this intransigent aristocrat with
his fellow-citizens of Ephesus transpires from such sayings as
B 121 (105 M) , 125a (106 M), 29 (95 M) , 104 (101 M) . What is
more important, Heraclitus' debt to his philosophical prede-
cessors is never acknowledged. No matter how much he owed to
Xenophanes or Pythagoras, he attacked them mercilessly. Take
the case of the close similarity between Xenophanes' and Hera-
clitus' theology -- one "impersonal" god, reaching everywhere
in the cosmos. In spite of that, Heraclitus will state in his
B 108 (83 M) , "Of all those whose teachings I have learned,
no one has reached the point of recognizing that the Wise
(being) is different from anything else."
In brief, the indiscriminate use of the paradoxical state-
ment by Heraclitus may well reflect his own noncomformist
,
maverick personality. After all, in this authoritarian Sturm-
und Drang period of the early Greek thought, were the self-
proclaimed Enlighteners Pythagoras and Xenophanes much different?
Ill
But there is more to that. Contrary to what he was preach-
ing, Heraclitus was well aware of the fact that his radical
and novel teachings were far from being accessible and easily
understandable to a common audience. A universal principle
(Logos) hidden within every given thing; an everliving Fire as
the underlying substance of all things; the principle of con-
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stant measures (or quanta) regulating the qualitative change
of the basic matter (fire) ; a God fundamentally different from
anything else; an equally universal principle of War as the
cause of differentiation in society and nature — such doc-
trines were far from being obvious to an ordinary man.
That Heraclitus' principles v/ere not present "on the sur-
face," manifest and easy to grasp, we may learn from his own
words: B 123 (8 M) , "The (real) constitution of a thing is
used (or likes) to hide" (cpuoLQ KpuTxxeadaL cplAel); B 18 (11 H) ,
"Unless one expects the unexpected (ediv un eAimxai, dveXuLOTOv) ,
he will not find it, for it is difficult to trace and grasp."
And I think we learn something about the audience's negative
reaction to Heraclitus' strange teachings from such outbursts
of the teacher's frustration as these: B 34 (2 M) , "People who
remain without comprehension (even) after they have been in-
structed, resemble the deaf.lt. is to them that the saying
applies: 'Present in body, absent in mind'." B 87 (109 M)
,
"A stupid man is wont to get stunned at every (new) teaching
he hears." B 97 (22 M) , "Dogs (not men) bark at those they do
not know" (i.e., attack every new doctrine without coming to
know it first). In brief, not without reason was Heraclitus
called "obscure" and "riddler" already in the times of Socrates
and Aristotle. Anyway, one would think, if his teachings were
clear enough, they would not have been that easily misunderstood
and misinterpreted by his pupil Cratylus (ap. Aristotle Metaph.
1010 a 7 ff . ) .
Now, in order to make his radical doctrines accessible to
the common man, in order to gain the minds and hearts of his
audiences, the Enlightener goes out of his way to present them
as something not contradicting but rather being based upon tra-
ditional wisdom. That is why Heraclitus so freely employs count-
less traditional folkloric motifs, popular sayings and proverbs,
catchy vivid similes, and even metrical form. Here are a fev;
examples of each cathegory.
(2) Folkloric Motifs. B 9 (37 M) , "Gold" and "Straw" brought to-
gether: stith Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk Literature, D 475.1.20;
D 451.5.6; Grimm, Wtirterbuch der deutschen Sprache, s.v. "Hackerling:
"
"Der Mann, der das Wenn und das Aber erdacht, / Hat sicher aus Hdckerling
Gold schon gemacht." — B 15 (50 M) , Dionysus is Hades: compare Dionysus'
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epithet \ieXavaiy IQ and Aeschyl. fr.228 N. (377 Mette) . — B 24 (96 M) :
cf . Plato Rep.V, 468 e, et al. — B 28 (19 M) , The goddess of Justice is
slow in coming, but will eventually prevail: Euripid. fr.979 N. — B 30
(51 M) , The divine origin of the "everliving" Fire: of., e.g., Aristoph.
Lysistr. 306 TO nijp . . . L,f^ ; L. Radermacher, "Lebende Flamme," Wiener Studien
49 (1931) 115-18; M.L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford
1971) 170 ff . — B 36 (66 M) , Human flesh is earth (clay) , human blood is
water: Iliad 7.99; Hesiod Opera 61; Xenophanes B 29 and 33; A 50; Apollo-
dor. Bibl.1.1 .1. — B 45 (67 M) , The "bonds" (neipaxa) of the soul:
Iliad 7.102, et al. — B 63 (73 M) , Heroes as guardians of men: Hesiod
Operal22 f
.
; 252 f
.
; Plato Crat.23Q a; Rep. V, 469 a. — B 66 (82 M)
,
Fire as the last judge. — B 78 (90 M) , B 102 (91 M) , B 79 (92 M) , B 52
(93 M) , God alone possesses wisdom, man's lot is to remain ignorant:
Iliad 2.485 f. (and the instances quoted above, ending with note 8). —
B 85 (70 M) , duucp uctxeodaL xctAenov, "it is hard to fight against
the heart's desire:" Plato Legg.lX, 863 b 3; Hep. 11, 375 b 1; Euripid.
Medeal079 f . ; fr.257 N., et al. — B 85 (70 M) , 4^uxnQ XL (OVeCadaL,
"To buy something at the price of soul:" Longinus De sublim . AA . 9 ; Euripid.
Medea968; Xenophon Cyrop. 3. 1.36; Isocrat. 6 {Arohidamus) .109; A.G. 7.622.6;
Persius 6.75. — B 88 (41 M) , "Dead" changes round to "Living," "Old" to
"Young:" Melissus B 8.3; Plato Phaedo 70 c 9. — B 94 (52 M) , The "bounds"
of Helios, and Dike in charge of cosmic events: cf. G. Vlastos, C.P. 42
(1947) 156-78 (esp. 164-68) . — B 117 (69 M) , B 118 (68 M) , A drunken soul
is a Det soul; a dry (sober) soul is wisest and best: Xenophon Symp. 2. 24;
Aristoph. Knights 96 = 114. — B 119 (94 M) : Theognis 161-64; Menander
fr.714 K&rte; Phocylides fr.l6 Diels; Plato Legg.V, 732 c; VII, 804 a;
IX, 877 a;Phaedo 107 d; 108 b; 113 d; Rep. X, 617 de; 620 de; Tim. 90 a;
90 c. — A 19 (108 M) , The time-span from the begetting of a grandparent
to that of his grandchild makes a complete cycle of human life, or one
generation of thirty years — 2 x (14 + 1) = 30. The human life-span con-
sists of hebdomads: Solon fr.27 West, et alibi.
{3) P o p u I a r sayings. B2(23 M), 5ei: eueaOau
TCp ^uvcp; compare deep enou (DK appar. ad I, p. 62. 18; Marcus Aurel.
10.11.4); eixeo vdyxi) Herodot.5.18.2; Thucyd. 2 . 35. 3; Cleanthes Hymn.Iovis
24 ff . ~ B 11 (80 M) : cf . Plato Critias 109 be, et al. — B 13 (36 M)
:
Semonides fr.7.2 ff. West; NT 2 Petri 2:22; Epictet. 4. 11. 29 and 31;
Aristid. Orat. 33.31; Luc ian Anachars. 1; Horace Epist. 1.2 .26; Hippolyt.i?e-
fut. 9.7.3; A.G. 14.106.3; Paroem.Gr. I, p. 376; II, p. 705, et al. —
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B 18 (11 M) : Archiloch. fr. 122.1 West, XPnuaxcov deAuxov ouSev tax iv
.
Euripid. fr.761 N. ; Ps. -Linus ap. Stob.5.46.1. — B 22 (70 M) . — B 33
(104 M) : cf. Iliad 2.204. — B 34 (2 M) , uapeovxas ctTieLvaL: Aristoph.
Knights 1119 ff . ; TG fr. adesp. 517 N. ; Paroem. Gr.l, p. 446; II, p. 766.
B 43 (102 M) : Herodot . 5 . 77 . 4 (Simonid. fr. 100.3 Diehl) ; Plato Legg.
VIII, 835 e; Herodot. 8. 77. 1. — B 44 (103 M) : Cicero N.D. 3.94; Aaad. 11
137; Tusa. 4.43. — B 56 (21 M) : eleven instances in Marcovich, Eraalito,
ad fr.21. — B 58 (46 M) : Diog. Laert.3.85; Aeschyl. Agam. 849; Plato
Gorg. 456 b; 479 a; 480 c; 521 e--522 a; i?ep. Ill, 406 d; IV, 426 b; Prot.
354 a; Tim. 64 d; 65 b; Polit. 293 b. Xenophon Memor. 1.2.54. — B 72 (4 M) :
Lysias 14.44, TOLQ OLHELOLS SLcicpopoe. — B 74 (89 M) , (be TxaL6ac
TOKEoavoov: cf. Aristot. Soph. El. 174 b 2; E.N. 1164 b 22; Muson. Ruf.
fr.l6 (p. 82 Hense) . — B 92 (75 M) : five instances in Marcovich, Evaclito,
ad fr.75. — B 93 (14 M) , oriyaxa of the Pythian Apollo. — B 95 + 109
(110 M) : see Marcovich ad fr.llO. — B 97 (22 M) : cf. Odyssey 20 .15; 16.4
ff. — B 100 (64 M) : cf. Plut.Ce def. ovao. 416 A; Cypria fr.4.3 Allen;
Odyssey 9.131; Xenophon ^nafc. 1. 4. 10;Cz/neg'. 5. 34; Aristid.Or. 32.25; 26.11;
44.16; Marcus Aurel.4.23; 9.3; lulian Or. 2, 101 C; A.G.9.51; Verg .Eol. 9 .51.
— B 101a (6 M) : Herodot. 1. 8. 2 ; Thucyd. 1. 73 . 2 ; Philo passim; Dio Chrysost.
12.71; Paroem.Gr.il, p. 744, et al. — B 104 (101 M) : Diog. Laert.1.88;
DK I, p. 65. 2; Cleanthes fr.lOO Pearson; Herodot. 3. 81. 1.
(4) Comparisons. Out of some ninety Heraclitean frag-
ments consisting of more than three words only, comparison occurs no less
then eleven times: B 1 (1 M) , 56 (21 M) , 114 (23^ M) , 51 (27 M) , 90 (54 M)
,
67 (77 M) , 5 (86 M, twice) , 79 (92 M) , 29 (95 M) , 44 (103 M) . Similes com-
prise all his teachings — the Logoslehre and Theology (four instances in
each), Ethics (twice) and Cosmology (once). Doubtless, Heraclitus' pic-
turesque similes play much the same role as his countless concrete illus-
trations of the abstract but universal Logos — both are devised to make
his novel doctrine accessible to the ordinary man. As for the number of
examples taken from daily life to illustrate Logos, already Philo was
forced to give credit to Heraclitus: "...Heraclitus wrote books on nature,
getting his opinions on opposites from our theologian (i.e. , Moses) and
adding a great number of laborious arguments to them" (Quaest. in Genesim
111. 5;Quis rerum divin. heres 214).
Incidentally, it is worth mentioning with what insistency does Hera-
clitus employ one and the same example. Adult man is compared to (even
identified with) an unfledged boy no less than five times among the extant
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fragments — four times to the disadvantage of the adult man: B 56 (21 M)
,
117 (69 M) , 52 (93 M) , 121 (105), 79 (92 M) . As for the coincidence (or,
at least, a single aontinuum) between the opposites "Life" - "Death;"
"Immortality" - "Mortality," it had become a real obsession for the
Ephesian: he employs it no less than eight times in the available,
scarce evidence: B 53 (29 M) , 48 (39 M) , 88 (41 M) , 62 (47 M) , 26 (48 M)
,
21 (49 M) , 15 (50 M) , 36 (66 M) .
{5) H e r a a I i t u s Poeticus. That Heraclitus'
rhythmical prose consists of well balanced and elaborate clauses, is
common knowledge (that is why the fragments are printed this way in my
editions of Heraclitus) . In addition, metrical forms seem to be detectable
in some of his sayings. For example, second half of a hexameter is pre-
sent in the following fragments
:
B 5 (86 M): -uu-uu- ou6 ' ripcjoag , OLTLV^s eCoL.
B 100 (64 M): -<ju -u«j - wpaQ , a'C Txdvxa cpepouoL.
B 3 (57 M): -uw-UU- e^pOQ TIOSOQ dvdpcOTXe LOU
.
If that is true, then later versifiers of Heraclitus — such as
Cleanthes, Scythinus, Ps. -Linus, the poet of Orph. fr.226 Kern -- had
only to follow the example of the master. Hence the imitations:
[B 136] ( [96b] M) : ipuxat, dpritqsaTOL HadapcoxepaL f\ evL vouaous.
[B 137] ( [28d ]M): - Kj kj -uu -uu - eLuapu^va TxdvTcos.
Moreover, complete iambic trimeters seem to hide in three genuine
sayings and in one imitation:
B 78 (90 M) : nSoQ ydp dvdpconei-ov u^v ouk exei Yvcouote,
detov 5t exei. (As transmitted).
nOos ydp dvdpojTxe L ov oO Yvoouas exei,
deuov 5' ex£ L . (Scripsi post Gu. Heidel) .
B 33 (104 M) : v6uOQ Hal PouAiii TtELdeadaL ev6s. (As transmitted).
vouos <6e ) Hal PouA^i ^ol) TxeideadaL tvoc,. (Conieci) .
B 49 (98 M) : elg ep.ol UUPLOl,, edv dpLOXOS ^, (As transmitted).
eiQ uupLOL uoL <y' eaxLv), f\v dpLoxos i^. (Conieci) .
[B 47] [113 M] : un etKn ixepl xcov uey loxoov auuPccAAooueOa. (Transmitted)
U^ ELxti ueYLOXCJV ducpL auu&cxAAdjueQoi. (Conieci).
Finally, there is a leaythion in B 100 (64 M) : oupOQ audptou Aloq
( - w - X - u -) . Maybe the form Al6q — for the expected Zt]v6q
15)from B 32 (84 M) — was employed by Heraclitus metm- gvatxa.
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IV
Aoyos, one of the key-words in Heraclitus, appears in
two different senses among the extant fragments — "principle
^
(rule, law)," and "proportion, (ratio, measure)." Now, I think
these two meanings are indicative of the presence of two dif-
ferent major doctrines in Heraclitus, which may overlap but
are distinguishable enough. One teaching is dealing with the
universal principle of coincidentia oppositorum -- on a rather
logical or metaphysical level; the other addresses itself to
the equally universal substratum Fire, covering the fields of
physics, theology and psychology.
To be more specific, the word A6yos occurs 12 times among
the preserved sayings. Three of these instances may be dis-
carded at once, as belonging to spurious fragments. B [126a]
([118] M) , a late forgery, had been rejected already by Diels.
In B 72 (4 M) , the words Aoycp, xcp to. bXo. 5lolhouvtl, have
been recognized as an explanation introduced by Marcus Aure-
lius (4.46) already by Bywater (in 1877). As for B 115 (112 M)
,
Jjuxne eoTL Aoyoc eauxov au^cov , I had argued that the saying
is most probably spurious, on the following grounds: (1) It is
transmitted under the name of Socrates, not Heraclitus. (2)
The statement, "Soul has a (numerical) ratio that increases
itself," is highly reminiscent of the concept of soul advanced
by Xenocrates Academicus (fr.60 Heinze) -- soul is a number
capable of increasing itself: dpuOuov... auxov aOsovxa xf\v
cpuoLV aOxns (sc. xf\c, ^Juxnc) , Plotinus 6.5 (23). 9. 13; Plut. De
animae procr .1012 D; Aristot. De anima 404 b 29; 408 b 32;
Aetius 4.2.3-4. And (3), "measure" is something constant, fixed
and unchangeable in Heraclitus (cf. B 31 (53 M)
,
uexpiexai
eCs xov a0x6v A6yov okoUos np6oOev nv...): a "measure" capable
of increasing itself cannot be paralleled in Heraclitus.
In the next three instances of X6yoQ, the word has insi-
gnificant philosophical import. B 87 (109 M) , "A stupid man
tends to get stunned at every (new) word (or teaching) he
hears." B 108 (83 M)
, 6K6aa)v A6you£ fixouaa, o65eLS dcpLKveLxai
es xoOxo cooxe Yt-vcoaxeLv ox l . . . , "Of all those whose teachings
I have heard, no one reaches the point of recognizing that...".
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B 39 (100 M) , 'Ev IIplt'ivt;! Bias eyevexo 6 TeuTdueoj, ou iiAeoJv
X6yoQ f\ Tc5v dAAcov , "In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutames
,
who is of more account (esteem ) than the rest" -- a common
Ionian idiomatic phrase, as, e.g., in Herodotus 2.89.1.
The rest of six instances is split in two different tech-
nical meanings: principle -- in B 1 (1 M, twice) , B 2 (23 M)
,
and B 50 (26 M) ; proportion, measure -- in B 31 (53 M) and
B 45 (67 M) . The former four cases obviously deal with the
Logostehre , the latter two with the Feuerlehre
.
To take the latter two first, the term XoyoQ seems to
serve as a synonym of the term uexpa.So much is clear by com-
paring B 31 (53 M) -- " <Earth> is liquefied as sea, and
is measured in the same proportion as existed before it became
earth," (^f\) ddXaoaa 6Lax^exaL, xal uexpeexaL eCs xov auxov
Aoyov OHOLOS Tip6adev r\v f\ yevdaOaL -if], -- to B 30 (51 M) --
"This world-order... always was and is and will be: an ever-
living fire, being kindled in measures and going out in measures,"
... Tiup dei^coov, ctTixiuevov uexpa nai dixoaPevvuuevov u^xpa.
The saying B 45 (67 M) is less clear, but the sense "propor-
tion, measure" (i.e., of the qualitative change "blood-water"
into "soul-fire") seems to be the most likely one: "If you
start looking for the "bonds" (beginning and end) of the soul,
you will not find them, even if you travel over every path
(i.e., in every horizontal direction): so deep a measure the
soul has" -- i.e., hidden in the depth of the body, in the
hot exhalation from blood: compare B 36 (66 M) , "...and out of
water soul comes-to-be . " In both cases A6yoq refers to the
qualitative change of matter (fire, water, earth), i.e., to
physics.
On the contrary, Aoyos in B 1 (1 M, twice) , B 2 (23 M)
,
and B 50 (26 M) refers to a logical principle-- to the unity
of two opposites within every given thing. This universal prin-
ciple (guvoQ A6yos) was the great discovery of Heraclitus, and
he elevated it to the rank of an dboective, universal law, ope-
rative in the surrounding world of our daily experience. This
ohjeotivization of a logical principle (rule or statement) must
have been Heraclitus' own innovation.
Now, that the Logos exists outside the human mind, can be
seen both from B 1 and B 50. The opening sentence of B 1 reads:
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"Men constantly prove to be void of comprehending this real
Logos -- both before they have heard it (sc. from me) and
once they have heard it" (xoO bk A6you to06' e6vTOQ aCei,
dsuvexoL YLVovxaL dvOpcoixo l , x.al Tip6aOev f\ dKOuaai xal dnou-
oavxes x6 irpcoxov) . The phrase, "both before they have heard
it and...," makes it clear that men are expected to grasp
the universal, omnipresent Logos by themselves -- from the
surrounding v/orld of their daily experience -- "Most men do
not notice things they encounter...," B 17 (3 M), — And B 50
reads: "If you have heard, not me but the Logos, it is wise
(i.e., it is logically necessary) to agree that all things
are one" (oux euou dAAd xoO A6you dnouaavxas b\ioXoyeZv ao(p6v
eoxLV Ev ndvxa eTvaL). Here again, the opposition, "not me but
the Logos," is best explained as implying: "You need not be-
lieve me: convince yourselves through your own experience.
For the Logos is present (operative) in every thing around you."
This simple explanation, however, has been challenged
by serious scholars. M. L. West, for example, sees in the say-
ing a contrast between Heraclitus' personal authority and the
force of his argument: " 'Don't listen to me but to what I'm
saying. . . ' Heraclitus is telling men that they should be per-
suaded not by his personal authority but by the autonomous
17)
authority of his argument." To leave aside the improbability
of such a "split personality," of a contrast between two parts
of the same person, we may well ask, "And just where is this
'personal authority' of the lonely Ephesian? In the extant
fragments, he speaks of himself as of one talking to the deaf
— B 34 (2 M) , B 87 (109 M) , B 97 (22 M) , — and as a loser
in the eyes of his fellow-citizens — B 121 (105 M) , 125a (106 M)
C. H. Kahn sees in B 50 a contrast between Heraclitus and
the Logos in the listeners ' souls: "The thought will be: listen
not to me but to the discourse within your soul, and it will
18
)
tell you all." He refers to B 45 (67 M) , "the deep Logos of
the soul." This interpretation is not likely either. For, (1)
it still leaves unexplained the phrase of B 1, "Men remain un-
comprehending of the Logos both before they have heard it and
once they have heard it (sc. from me)." And (2), the word
ueLpaxa -- "bonds (beginning and end) of the soul" -- in B 45
witnesses to the fact that the phrase, ouxco 3cxOuv A6yov sxei
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(sc. li/uxT*! ) / in the same fragment, must refer to the very nature
of the soul (such as "a regulated hot exhalation from blood").
And that is very far from the idea of "a discourse within
your soul.
"
In brief, any attempt to see in XoyoQ one single sense
covering all extant fragments -- expressed, e.g., by Ewald
Kurtz, "Jede Betrachtung des heraklitischen Logosbegrif fes
muss von zwei Tatsachen ausgehen: dass A-oyos nur einen Be-
19
)
deutungsaspekt hat und..." -- should be resisted as mis-
leading and contradicting the evidence. And to assume -- as,
20
)
e.g., G. S. Kirk does, -- that. This Logos, in its mate-
rial aspect, must be a kind of fire," is to underestimate
the great metaphysical discovery of Heraclitus -- his Logos-
lehre (recognized both by Philo and Hippolytus, Refut .IX. 9-10} ,
In conclusion, one single doctrine in Heraclitus is not
likely. The double role of Polemos, among the extant fragments,
is indicative of the existence of more than just one Heracli-
tean teaching. Among some nine different reasons for the unity
21)
of opposites employed by Heraclitus, "war, strife, war-
vortex, tension, etc." appears as the most cogent one. In a
strung but resting bow, it is exactly the tension between the
two bow-arms, tending in opposite directions, that makes the
instrument effective, B 51 (27 M) . "The barley-posset disinte-
grates (sc, into its two opposite ingredients -- the solid
barley and the liquid wine) unless it is stirred (i.e., unl<_ss
there is an interaction or "war-vortex" between the two oppo-
sites)," B 125 (31 M) . And it is "strife (not peace) that is
the normal course of affairs (eC6^<vaL) xPn t^ov rc6Aeuov edvxa
^uv6v xal Slktiv eptv...), B 80 (28 M) .
In brief. War appears as a cause of unity, and that is why
both Logos and Polemos are called "common to all" or "univer-
sally valid" (guv6Q ) — B 2 (23^ M) and B 80 (28 M) , — and
why the phrase, Y lvou^vgov TxdvxGov xaxa xov Aoyov xovoe , of B 1,
matches the phrase, YLVoueva Txdvxa xax ' epiv, of B 80. In addi-
tion to being an agent of unitz/^ however , Polemos appears as a
cause of differentiation in every Greek city-state: "War is
father of all and king of all, and it is he who renders some
gods (i.e., heroes), others (mortal) men; it is he who makes
some slaves, others free men, and so on (e.g., it is he who
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makes some rich, others poor)," B 53 (29 M) . Obviously, such
a necessary social differentiation has nothing to do with the
principle of unity of opposites, but rather an outspoken aristo-
cratic advocate of the ethias of war-heroes is to be heard
here — compare, e.g., B 24 (96 M) , dprn-cpaxous Oeol tlucool
Hal dvdpoonoL; B 29 (95 M) , B 25 (97 M) .
Heraclitus' Logoslehre and Feuerlehre may overlap, but
they are still two different autonomous doctrines. For example,
pairs of opposites do appear in Heraclitus' physics (B 65
(55 M) ; B 84a (56a M) ) , psychology (B 36 (66 M) ) , and theology
(B 67 (77 M) ) , but the point is that, in these fragments,
the philosopher is not trying to prove the unity of opposites
but rather to explain the manifestations and functions of the
everliving Fire. Presumably, Heraclitus had started explain-
ing this world-order by means of his great discovery — the
universal principle of coinoidentia oppositorum. But an ab-
stract logical principle could not explain the plurality and
diversity of the world-order, for the simple reason that it
could not undergo qualitative change. Fire, however, was an
ideal principle and substance for such a qualitative xpoiiri
,
uexa^oAri, dAAoLoooLC.
Hence the presence of two concurrent doctrines in Hera-
clitus. Logos explains the unity of this world-order by means
of its logical universal validity or operativity, by its ubi-
quity, omnipresence in every particular thing. Or say Logos
(S) is "present" in the particular thing a, and in & , c ...
and z. Now, thanks to the fact that Logos is "common to all,"
that all things share in the same Logos, all particular things
themselves are interconnected, forming one single continuum
(S = a; Y, - b; S = c; ... S = 2. Hence a = b = c = ... z)
-- ouK euou dAAd xoO Aoyou dnouaavxaQ ouoAoyelv ao(p6v eoxlv
ev ndvxa elvai, B50 (26 M) . In its turn. Fire
explains the unity of this world-order by the fact that it is
its universal underlying basic substance -- B 30 (51 M) ; B 90
(54 K) . But while Logos accounts for the unity alone. Fire
can explain both unity and plurality -- thanks to its constant
and regulated qualitative change.
Miroslav Marcovich 187
In conclusion, Heraclitus' physical world-order displays
unity and balance. Unity -- thanks to the universal basic
substance Fire; balance -- thanks to uexpa or A6YOQ,i.e., a
regulated qualitative change of fire into water and earth,
and backwards. Heraclitus' metaphysical world-order also shows
balance and unity. Balance -- thanks to the internal unity of
two opposites within every given thing; unity -- thanks to
the universal validity of this principle of aoincidentia
oppositorum, also called Logos.
University of Illinois at Urbana
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